Það verður ábyggilega mikið rætt um nýja skýrslu OECD um efnahagsmál á Íslandi næstu dagana.
Skýrsluna er að finna á þessari slóð í pdf skjali.
Eitt af því sem maður staðnæmist við er kaflinn þar sem fjallað er um tjónið af hruninu. Þar er meðal annars skoðaður hlutur Seðlabankans og er sú mynd ekki fögur:
„However, the direct fiscal costs of the financial crisis incurred by the Iceland government have not been limited to the costs of restructuring financial institutions. The main costs were incurred in the months before the banks failed when the CBI lent to them against collateral of dubious quality (mainly claims on other Icelandic banks) in what appears with hindsight to have been a strategy of gambling for resurrection. Losses on these loans and on bank securities held by the Treasury amounted to 13% of GDP. In addition, there have been the costs of called loan guarantees (1,5% of GDP). Adding these costs to the costs of restructuring financial institutions brings total direct costs of the financial crisis to about 20% of GDP, which is higher than in any other country except Ireland.“ (bls. 10-11)
